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Abstract Digital capabilities can improve organizations’
performance by supporting complex decision-making processes. However, when market standards constrain their
enactment, the potential benefits promised by digital
capabilities do not realize. The paper explores this tension
by means of the critical case of a European airline, which
had difficulty to enact a novel pricing approach and finds
that market standards are entrenched in the airline’s pricing
and distribution ecosystem. This causes the organization to
focus on local improvements and IT-based workarounds
instead of enacting a dramatically new and potentially
improved digital pricing capability.
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1 Introduction and Motivation
Digital capabilities draw on emergent technologies to
support innovative decision making (Wheeler 2002). Here,
we define such capabilities as the technological and organizational ability to implement decision making through
advanced algorithms. Examples include producing datadriven market insights into customer experience, controlling sales via online channels, or managing fulfillment
processes. For example, Amazon’s ability to excel in
e-commerce relies partly on advanced customer relationship management and recommender algorithms (Kantor
and Streitfeld 2015). Netflix’ ability to disrupt the television industry relies partly on its collaborative filtering
algorithms (Kirn 2010). Uber’s disruption of the taxi
market builds on algorithmic matching practices (Scheiber
2017).
Digital capabilities pose new challenges for practitioners
and researchers of strategy, organization, and information
systems (Orlikowski and Scott 2015), including the ways in
which they produce and rely on interdependencies in larger
ecosystems. In the transport industry, airlines are at the
forefront of enacting digital capabilities to implement
sophisticated pricing strategies. Following Bitran and
Caldentey (2003), we define pricing as deciding what price
to offer, to which customer, and at what time in the
booking horizon, given a particular distribution channel.
Furthermore, we define a digital pricing capability as
combining organizational expertise and technological
resources to support this decision through advanced pricing
and revenue management algorithms.
The distinct challenges of building and enacting digital
capabilities remain understudied. A number of authors
point out this research gap (Leonardi and Barley 2008; Yoo
et al. 2012; Introna et al. 2016). In particular, we do not
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fully understand the long-term interplay between evolving
digital capabilities and market standards. Thus, we ask:
How Do Market Standards Inhibit the Enactment of
Digital Capabilities?
Following the call for research stated in Hinterhuber and
Liozu (2017), we strive to highlight organizational factors
in the persistence of certain pricing practices. In considering this question by means of a critical case, we respond
to a call by Introna et al. (2016) to examine the long-term
implications of digital technology properties for technoorganizational phenomena. Here, we assume such properties to describe the nature of digital pricing capabilities,
whereas techno-organizational phenomena denote the
ability to enact new digital capabilities.
Our research draws on a longitudinal inductive case
study (Langley 1999). Specifically, we consider a European
airline’s digital pricing capability from 2003 to 2015. In the
sense of Flyvbjerg (2006), this is a ‘‘critical case,’’ as it
features a best-in-class airline which is well-known for its
top-notch pricing practices and helps to gain insights from
the perplexing rigidity of enacted capabilities. We document the enactment of the airline’s pricing capability as
adhering to a particular market standard, the booking class.
Finally, we examine IT-based workarounds intended to
compensate for the perceived rigidity.
We aim to refine theory by showing that market-based
restrictions can motivate local improvements and IT-based
workarounds rather than far-reaching changes in the
enacted digital capabilities. Short-term improvements circumvent limitations without fully resolving them. As our
primary practical contribution, we examine the conflicts
and tensions that hinder enacting a digital capability, such
as pricing, even given existing algorithms and technology.

2 Background and Methodology
2.1 Pricing as a Digital Capability
The term capability stems from strategic management and
refers to reliable resource allocation and configuration
patterns embedded in organizations. As Schreyögg and
Kliesch-Eberl (2007) emphasize, a capability implies the
repeated ability to succeed in a specific application area.
Digital capabilities use emergent technologies for
business innovation to create customer value (Wheeler
2002). When it comes to pricing, the aspect of customer
value may not be obvious at first sight. However, differentiated pricing is a premise for the economical extension
of the firm’s product portfolio. For instance, the introduction of airline revenue management enabled airlines to
deliberately offer drastically reduced fares, making air
travel accessible to a much larger proportion of the
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population. Firms realize value through digital capabilities
by repeatedly going through a series of steps. These are,
firstly, selecting emergent technologies; secondly, matching technologies with economic opportunities; thirdly,
implementing business innovations for growth; and
fourthly, assessing customer value.
A pricing capability requires identifying competitor
prices, setting a pricing strategy, and translating the pricing
strategy to a price (Dutta et al. 2003). This requires technical and organizational knowledge about products as well
as sales force expertise. Pricing also needs strategic,
financial, and economic competencies, and requires analytic and conflict resolution skills. This is rarely available
from a single source. Custom systems and databases may
exist for prices, products, as well as foresight and optimization. Multiple people, systems, and activities make to
enactment of and value realization from capabilities a
socially and technically complex process for organizations
(Orlikowski 2002).
Eisenhardt and Martin (2000), interested in the emergence of capabilities, propose that while capabilities are
organization-specific, they often build on market standards
and best practices. Firms absorb knowledge and skills to
incorporate this information in their own practices (Cohen
and Levinthal 1990). However, tension rises as firms can
only build distinct capabilities by deviating from market
practices. Adding a dynamic perspective, Burgelman
(2002) observes that a firm’s capabilities and their market
often co-evolve. In short, firm and market are in a subtle
and dynamic relationship; capabilities build on what is
already there, but must also deviate from it.
The digital capability airline pricing exemplifies this.
Given increasingly competitive markets, airline pricing
systems have become ‘‘one of the most arcane and complex
information systems on the planet’’ (McAfee and te Velde
2006: 527). Emergent technologies based on reservation
systems have played a major role in this process (Copeland
and McKenney 1988; Littlewood 2005). Isler and D’Souza
(2009) describe how airlines advanced their pricing algorithms over many decades. The results enable them to
adjust the offered prices continuously to maximize revenue. The textbook example of revenue management sorts
customers into business or leisure categories to anticipate
their ‘‘willingness-to-pay.’’
Airline pricing also illustrates how digital capabilities
require both evolving expert skills and algorithms. Airline
pricing algorithms have undergone several such phases of
improvement from simple overbooking, fictitious booking
classes, virtual nesting, to bid pricing (Lehrer 2000). Such
incremental changes to digital capabilities are the dominant
path to learning, as several factors hinder enacting novel
digital capabilities completely.
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Firstly, organizations can encounter market-based
restrictions when tying themselves to the wrong vendor,
technology, or standard. For example, conversion costs and
technological interrelatedness created a lock-in in the case
of the QWERTY keyboard layout (David 1985).
Secondly, once a certain (technological) path has been
chosen by an organization, further decisions and actions
can reinforce it (Schreyögg and Kliesch-Eberl 2007;
Sydow et al. 2009; Schreyögg and Sydow 2011). This
includes, among other things, investments in complementary assets, resources, and capabilities, learning effects, or
coordination effects (Sydow et al. 2009). As pointed out by
Burger and Sydow (2014), developing and enacting new
capabilities requires collective action by multiple actors,
who are partially unaware of the dominant action pattern,
or unwilling or unable to change it.
However, there is little research on the evolution of
digital capabilities with respect to how market standards
affect their enactment. The cautionary tale from the airline
industry considered here explores this further.
2.2 Research Context: Airline Pricing
Airline pricing has become part of an increasingly global
and collaborative distribution process. Airlines rely on
global standards established during the industry’s initial
digitization (Copeland and McKenney 1988). These are
both useful and daunting. On the one hand, they enable
global alliances, which can extend networks via code share
flights. On the other hand, and with increasingly transparent and competitive markets, many full-service airlines felt
restricted in enacting the full potential of their pricing
capabilities (Isler and D’Souza 2009).
A significant standard underlying airline pricing are
booking classes. These define product conditions and price
levels. When the airline offers tickets in one booking class,
the corresponding price is available at the booking class’
conditions. When disk space was limited in the 1950s and
60s, programmers designated booking classes by a single
letter. Today, many industry experts point out that the
standard’s discrete nature hinders fully individualized services (Isler and D’Souza 2009; Pölt 2011; Westermann
2013). Nevertheless, booking classes are still crucial to
handle aspects such as bonus miles or codeshare contracts.
In accordance with Bitran and Caldentey (2003), we
portray three interdependent pricing practices: ‘‘price setting,’’ ‘‘revenue management,’’ and ‘‘distribution.’’
Price setting defines the combinations of prices and
conditions offered per booking class. Exemplary conditions
include flexible refunds or the necessity for a weekendstay. The results are published in global distribution systems (GDS). GDS combine information from hundreds of
airlines in large-scale information infrastructures. Three

281

major GDS providers, SABRE, Amadeus, and Galileo/
Apollo, dominate the global market.
Revenue management determines the set of booking
classes to offer at any time of the sales horizon. This
decision first requires forecasting demand as dependent on
time and the set of offers. Subsequently, an optimization
algorithm calculates the sets to offer in order to maximize
expected revenue from sales. Human analysts can amend
the results to account for additional information and
objectives, such as competitor’s offers or marketing events.
The results control the airline’s inventory.
Distribution communicates offers to customers via
indirect channels, such as travel agents or intermediary
websites, and direct channels, such as the airline’s website
or sales offices. In the traditional model, all channels access
the GDS.
Dynamic pricing represents an alternative to the processes of price setting and revenue management described
above. Instead of relying on booking classes, this concept
can accommodate continuous prices and unlimited combinations of prices and conditions (Elmaghraby and Keskinocak 2003). Dynamic pricing relies on discriminating
customer characteristics to set an individual price per
request. Potentially, this enables incremental gains in both
revenue and flexibility for further business objectives, such
as customer relationship management. However, dynamic
pricing requires a sales channel that can differentiate
individual customers. This is not feasible when distribution
relies on offering the same set of booking classes to all
customers that send a request at the same time.

3 Case Study
As a critical case, we purposefully selected a European
airline and dubbed it ‘‘Phoenix’’. Phoenix is a traditional
network airline, primarily targets business customers, and
functions partially independently within a holding group.
We chose Phoenix for three reasons. First, Phoenix is
renowned for its sophisticated pricing. Second, Phoenix has
developed an advanced pricing capability and has repeatedly but unsuccessfully attempted to transform it. Third,
the firm operates an intercontinental route network, which
creates additional dependencies.
3.1 Data Collection and Analysis
Our case data cover a period of 12 years (2003–2015); we
collected most of the primary data over 3 years
(2011–2014). Table 1 lists the data sources, involving
interviews, direct observations, and archival materials. The
data provides a rich account of how Phoenix’ pricing
capability evolved and how the firm enacted it.
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Table 1 Qualitative data sources
Revenue management and pricing

Management

GDS and distribution ecosystem

CEOa (39)

COOa

Interviews and public speeches
Firm

Head of Revenue Management (19 interview, 29 public
streamsa)

Head of Marketinga

Head of Innovation Lab (49)
Revenue Management Analyst (29)
Group
network

Former Head of Revenue Management of largest group airline

Member of Board

Head of Revenue Management of another group airline

Group CEOa (29)

Head of e-/mobile commerce largest
group firm
VP Online Retail and Distribution at
Group Coa

Market

Head of Pricing of major competitor

CIO of major
competitor

Head of Revenue Management of major competitor

Manager Technology at largest European
GDS (29)
Manager Frequent Flyer Program at major
competitor
Aviation/distribution expert-1
Aviation/distribution expert-2

Observations
Consortium workshop with experts from four partnering airlines and universities (1d)
User training for revenue management analysts (2d)
Expert workshops with revenue management analysts (29 2d)
Archival Documents
Internal documents and memos written (#12), press releases
(#2), reports (#1), web pages and blogs (#3), practitioner journal
articles (#10)

Press releases (#4),
web pages and blogs
(#13)

Internal documents and memos written
(#9), press releases (#4), web pages and
blogs (#12)

a

Analysis based on publically available video stream

Interviews and video analysis Interviews encompassed
the level of (1) the firm (Phoenix), (2) the group network
(i.e., airlines within the group holding and strategic alliances), and (3) the market. These interviews were conducted by the first author in person or via telephone and
targeted (a) revenue management and pricing experts,
(b) managers (mostly CEOs and CIOs), and (c) GDS and
distribution ecosystem experts. They varied in length
between 0.5 and 2.5 h and were tape-recorded and transcribed. The interviewee selection followed a snowballing
strategy starting from one key informant at each level
(firm, group, and market). Interviews were semi-structured
and focused on the barriers to introducing alternative
pricing approaches. We also analyzed video material from
public speeches to complement the data (Le Baron et al.
2018).
Direct observations The first author participated in a
2-day revenue management training in 2012 and all authors
took part in a revenue management strategy meeting in
2013. At the latter, several collaborating airlines, including
Phoenix, discussed pricing topics.
Archival material To avoid ‘‘retrospective bias,’’ which
potentially occurs when managers rephrase decisions to
make them more acceptable (Golden 1992), and to complement data collection, we triangulated the findings by
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cross-checking them against 70 archival documents (both
from internal and external sources). For instance, Phoenix
provided access to their revenue management strategy and
system specifications. We also considered ten articles from
the Journal of Revenue & Pricing Management to examine
Phoenix’s pricing capabilities in the context of industry
best practices. Finally, we challenged all insights against
the backdrop of two of the authors’ long-term industry
experience.
The data analysis followed a processual strategy (Langley
1999), focusing on key events and changes with respect to
the enactment of Phoenix’ pricing capability. First, we
prepared a timeline of key events and critical junctures.
Second, we further examined the collected case material
through a process of reading, tagging, and coding. Tags/codes emerged from theoretical and practical sources and
were adapted according to new insights. At the same time,
we prepared images and diagrams of our emerging insights,
which we discussed with key informants. This led to adaptations and further data collections. In particular, we conducted two additional workshops with Phoenix’s revenue
management experts to look into the relevant obstacles and
how they impede the move from the present to the desired
state. We enriched the data by further video material and reexamined the progress and developments within the case.
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3.2 Alternative Digital Pricing Capabilities
Before attempting to introduce dynamic pricing, Phoenix
had implemented a common system with fares filed for
booking classes. Figure 1 compares this system (A) to the
system of dynamic pricing, which Phoenix aimed to
implement (B).
The left part of Fig. 1 shows the traditional separation of
pricing and revenue management: Phoenix first set fares
and subsequently filed them to the GDS. Given these fares,
the revenue management process predicted demand for
booking classes and optimized the availability of these
classes. In a fifth step, fares were also quoted from the
GDS. Fare quotation coupled price-setting and distribution
via direct or indirect channels. This system was constrained
by the distribution systems requiring discrete booking
classes. As multiple fares could be filed per booking class,
but the revenue management process assumed one representative fare per booking class, revenue management and
pricing practices were somewhat mismatched to start with.
In the figure, a white lightning bolt indicates this mismatch.
The right part of Fig. 1 illustrates the pricing system
Phoenix aimed for at the time of our analysis. Via dynamic
pricing, Phoenix intended to optimize prices per booking
request. This system would also rely on a demand forecast,
which would support product bundling and the dynamic
pricing of the resulting bundles. A manager described the
envisioned scenario: ‘‘One step is to begin to allow any
arbitrary discount. And not only the 26 or 52 or whatever
number per booking class that I have published previously… the freedom to answer with any arbitrary number’’

(Senior RM expert I, #1). The stated goal was to rely on
booking classes solely to delineate compartment segmentations and the set of conditions per fare family.
The new pricing system would fully integrate revenue
optimization into the pricing process. While most practices
would fit well to each other in this scenario, fare filing was
expected to stay based on booking classes; replacing
existing legacy systems and processes were seen as more
time-consuming. In the figure, a black lightning bolt indicates this mismatch.
As a compensation for not being able to implement the
system of dynamic pricing, Phoenix cooperated with a
software vendor to develop another practice termed
‘‘pseudo dynamic pricing’’ (not shown in Fig. 1). This
workaround let Phoenix adjust the availability of booking
classes to the individual customers requesting flights.
Phoenix’ management expected the workaround to provide
a substantial competitive edge. In contrast to true dynamic
pricing, the approach still relied on controlling the offered
set of booking classes.
3.3 Tensions as Sources of Inertia and Conflict
Through our analysis, we could identify three main tensions leading to rigidity in the enactment of the new system
of dynamic pricing. These concerned (1) the control over
distribution channels, (2) conflicts and mismatches
between internal sales and revenue management units, and
(3) conflicts between the group network and the firm level
(see also Appendix 1; available online via http://spring
erlink.com).

(B) Dynamic pricing

5. Fare quotaon

Distribuon

6 b. Indirect

4. Availability opmisaon

Pricing

6. Dynamic interface

5. Fare quotaon

4. Fare ﬁling

3. Demand forecasng

Pricing

Revenue
management

Distribuon

(A) Pricing with booking classes
6 a. Direct
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3. Dynamic pricing

2. Product bundling

2. Fare ﬁling
1. Fare seng

1. Demand forecasng

Fig. 1 Pricing at Phoenix: present (A) and future (B)
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Control over distribution channels (1) The main source
of conflict which prevented Phoenix from implementing
the new system of dynamic pricing turned out to be the
indirect distribution channels, which exclusively relied on
GDS. At the time of our analysis, indirect sales collected
via GDS accounted for more than 70% of Phoenix’s revenues and were ‘‘indispensable’’ (Senior RM expert III,
#4). However, GDS distribution and the new system of
dynamic pricing opposed each other. Most importantly,
fare filing, the uploading of price lists via files to GDS, was
a tedious, slow, offline process. Moving to more flexible
(dynamic) interfaces necessary for the new system of
dynamic pricing required fundamentally new processes and
technologies. Phoenix tried to reduce the share of bookings
collected via GDS, e.g., by charging travel agents for the
higher costs of service, but this had shown little effect at
the time of our analysis.
A revenue management expert commented:
You constantly fall back on the GDS standards,
because this is the only thing that all airlines or all
distribution channels really know. (Senior RM expert
II, #2)
Similarly, an interviewee noted:
There are further dependencies. There is data
exchange among airlines, and eventually also within
GDS. Moreover, this has always been based on IATA
formats, there are entire lexicons, bibles so to speak,
that have come into being as telex formats and that
have remained gold standard until today. (Manager
Technology, #8)
This tension affected the process of fare quotation.
Quoting the cheapest applicable fares for itineraries in a
large network of flights is inherently complex. Many fares
and combinations exist. For this, Phoenix became dependent on GDS knowledge. As a manager explained:
We have 1.5 million public fares … that everybody
can look up, … and an additional 5 million private
fares with specific discounts for companies … that’s a
lot, and it’s not easy to know the cheapest applicable
fare for an … itinerary. The rules are tremendously
complex and only inscribed in this 30, 40 year-old …
fare-publishing system. (Senior RM expert I, #1)
Internal conflicts between sales and revenue management
units (2) The example of fare quotation also illustrated
another tension, namely between internal sales and revenue
management units. While the sales units had earlier left
fare quotation and the necessary machinery to the GDS, the
revenue management unit considered it critical. Differences in culture existed. One manager noted the tension
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between revenue management and sales units (e.g., corporate contracts). In his view, some sales employees held
on to the booking class standard ‘‘like drowning people’’
(Senior RM expert I, #1). While the revenue management
unit focused on analytically discerning customer segments
and demand, sales focused on market definition, fare rule
refinement, and marketing. To increase its control over the
fares, the revenue management later attempted to establish
fare quotation know-how internally and re-build this process completely in-house through a Connection Builder.
Revenue management and sales were not only in
opposition organizationally, but also technically, targeting
different levels of aggregation. Price setting as a sales
practice assigned multiple prices per booking class,
whereas the revenue optimization assumed that each class
earns a specific revenue. The mismatched aggregation
levels necessitated multiple IT-based workarounds,
extending the set of necessary pricing and revenue management systems. One expert stated: ‘‘With some tweaks,
you can maybe have 26 or 26*2 fares, as a magnitude,
which is an absolute nightmare when it comes to analysis.
You do not see clearly which is really applicable’’ (Senior
RM expert I, #1). In other words: ‘‘You can always only
somehow approximate. But you never really know whether
all of this is correct’’ (Board member, #6).
Group network versus firm level (3) The third tension
resulted from coordinating pricing in the group network
and strategic alliances (Gerlach et al. 2013). Phoenix was
part of an airline holding group which restricted dynamic
pricing in the envisioned sense and made it follow suit to
the holding’s requests. As a manager explained:
Matching booking classes was the first thing that was
done after Phoenix was acquired by the group. This
caused some effort but was still feasible. (Senior RM
expert I, #1)
Coordination-related tensions also became apparent
when Phoenix entered a transatlantic codeshare joint venture in 2011. To do so, it had to abandon advanced pricing
practices and return to a more conventional fare structure.
A responsible project manager explained:
On intercontinental routes, we had to replace certain
pricing methods because we had joined a transatlantic
joint venture. When other alliance members do not
even have an ‘origin-and-destination’ system, how
can you harmonize pricing? You can’t simply adopt
advanced fare structures without having the subsequent machinery in place (Senior RM expert II, #2).
All these tensions represent sources of inertia and conflict that feed the continued reliance on the booking class
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FIRM DIGITAL
PRICING
CAPABILITIES

2015

Q2/2013

Booking class standard

MARKET

GROUP AND
NETWORK

Q4/2008

2005

Q1/2005

Q4/2003

2003

Our research reveals that reliance on market standards
enabled the creation of an advanced digital pricing capability based on booking classes in cooperation with the
GDS in a first phase. Later, in a second phase, market
standards emphasized the tensions listed in the previous
section and obstructed the enactment of the new system of
dynamic pricing (Fig. 2).
The practice of revenue management is enacted through
forecasting demand and setting optimized inventory controls. In a first step, a reservation system supporting fixed
fare products and static availability rules based on booking
classes enabled this practice. After 2003, Phoenix implemented emergent revenue management technology allowing ‘‘pseudo dynamic pricing’’ in a network optimization
context. This enabled Phoenix to switch selected price
points on and off, but it excluded the possibility to tailor
prices to individual customers. Later, the constraints of

Q3/2011

3.4 The Constrained Enactment of Digital Capabilities
over Two Phases

such systems were relaxed by introducing simplified fares,
which makes pricing more flexible.
From 2008 onward, drawbacks of the booking class
standard became visible. Sales agents could trick the
pseudo dynamic pricing system to achieve lower prices.
Moreover, Phoenix could not maintain the newly introduced simplified price structures, as it had to coordinate
pricing with the group holding and its strategic alliances. In
turn, it introduced further workarounds building on a
seamless availability of request responses and extensions of
the pseudo dynamic pricing engine. Fare families made it
possible to group and re-bundle fares. To regain more
control over the distribution process, fare quotation knowhow was gradually rebuilt internally, for example by
implementing a Connection Builder.
Within the second phase, several evolutionary steps
overcame certain obstacles, but each further extended the
systems and algorithms based on the booking class standard. Thus, the evolution intensified the dependency of the
firm’s pricing capability on this market standard: for
example, pseudo dynamic pricing represents an evolution
of the pricing capability but does not move Phoenix closer
to the goal of dynamic pricing in the intended sense. In
short, Phoenix was surprisingly successful in working
around limitations despite existing constraints. It used
technological advances such as exporting data in the
booking class format in order to build advanced practices
such as pseudo dynamic pricing and fare family optimization, building on an increasingly differentiated set of
complementary practices. Nevertheless, Phoenix’s capability building relied on optimizing the set of offered
booking classes as the core pattern. Most practices successfully co-evolved around it. In consequence, the

Q1/2011
2011

standard. Implicitly, by requiring discrete fares, this standard has prevented the system of dynamic pricing and
thereby obstructed optimal price discrimination. Competitors implementing a purely direct distribution havenot been
restricted when implementing the system of dynamic
pricing and have been able to gain a crucial advantage, the
revenue management experts observed. Furthermore,
Phoenix wanted to pursue a strategy of individualized
offers targeting specific customers. By only enabling a
limited number of offer sets to cater for a limited number
of demand segments, the booking class standard has largely
prevented such individualized offers.
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Start of
merger talks
with Group Co.

Merger and matching
the booking classes
with Group Co.

Implementing
Fare
Pseudo Dynamic simplification
Pricing (DP) in
network optimization

Phoenix joins
transatlantic
alliance
Emergence of
Pseudo DP
drawbacks

Phase 1: market standards enable
digital pricing capabilities

Fares Introducing
Extending
Extending
more
fare family Pseudo DP via Pseudo DP via
complex optimization Connection New Distribution
Builder
Capability

Phase 2: market standards restrict exploitation of
new digital pricing capabilities

Fig. 2 Major phases of digital pricing capability development and enactment

123

286

D. Fürstenau et al.: How Do Market Standards Inhibit the Enactment of Digital Capabilities?, Bus Inf Syst Eng 62(4):279–287 (2020)

booking class standard became further entrenched in the
organization.
Adaptations to the digital pricing capability based on
booking classes introduced increasingly complex IT-based
workarounds. As one expert summarized, ‘‘the real drive
isn’t there. It’s like this often in life, the more workarounds
you get, the harder it becomes’’ (Board member, #6).
When Phoenix’s management recognized the maladaptation, it reflected on its own scope of action. This motivated Phoenix in 2015 to join an IATA initiative to pilot a
new distribution capability, NDC (O’Neil-Dunne 2014).
New affordances (i.e., GDS shopping interfaces and service lists) allowed Phoenix to demonstrate ‘‘more
dynamic’’ pricing in a travel agency context with large
transaction volumes. This was seen as a step toward
dynamic pricing in a multi-channel context. However,
managers voiced mixed feelings about the potential to
break away from the existing path and to overcome the
booking class standard. As one manager stated: ‘‘The tragedy is that we must soon unlimitedly support the old and
the new world’’ (Senior RM expert I, #1). At the end of our
investigation, a leading manager (#2) renewed his complaints about the fixation on booking classes, indicating the
(ongoing) restriction.

4 Summary and Outlook
This contribution aimed to advance understanding of how
market standards restrict the enactment of digital capabilities by analyzing the case of a European airline. Unlike
traditional capabilities, digital capabilities, which use
emergent technologies to create customer value, provide
new affordances (Yoo et al. 2012). These enabled Phoenix,
on the one hand, to cope with a rigid market standard. On
the other hand, the resulting IT-based workarounds
embedded the standard even further in Phoenix’s pricing
practices and information systems; resource-based, normative, and cognitive constraints hindered change.
4.1 Theoretical Implications
Our contribution shows how the enactment of digital
(pricing) capabilities including advanced (pricing) algorithms can conform to core patterns (optimizing booking
class availability) restricted by market standards (here, the
booking class standard). Previous authors have assumed
that capability core patterns are inherently social and local
(Sydow et al. 2009). However, this may not entirely fit
digital capabilities, where advanced algorithms are
entrenched in several information systems. Extending the
work of Wheeler (2002), we find that the interplay of
enacted digital capabilities and market standards can
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reduce the available set of strategies to a small subset, as
illustrated by pseudo dynamic pricing. Phoenix combined
and re-used existing technological elements to leap from
one restriction to the next. However, these constant changes did not necessarily lead to a global optimum; on the
contrary, they unintentionally further reinforced an existing
path of optimizing booking class availability.
Furthermore, our analysis suggests that the understanding of pricing capability in Dutta et al. (2003) is partial; it
does not consider the amount and intensity of interaction
with an ecosystem of distribution partners on multiple
levels. From this interaction, the three tensions described in
Sect. 3.3 arise: The control over distribution channels was
limited via the interaction with infrastructure providers, the
innovation within the organization was limited via the
interaction of interfacing departments, and the innovation
of pricing structures suffered from inertia due to the
interaction within the group and strategic alliance. Thus,
while a view of pricing as a process with clear boundaries
may be useful for limited situations, it should be extended
for other settings by looking at the interdependencies on
operational, tactical, and strategic levels.
4.2 Practical Implications
From a practitioner perspective, we consider the case to be
a cautionary tale about the practice of pricing systems and
algorithms. It highlights that an excellent body of theoretical research and the knowledge of technological
requirements do not necessarily suffice to transform the
current ways of handling complex decisions. Building on
the idea of the ‘‘reflective practitioner’’ (Schön 1991; Johns
2017), responsible managers should constantly monitor the
evolution and enactment of the firm’s digital capabilities
and the interplay with market standards. Doing so
encourages those in charge of implementing desired
changes to critically consider affordances and workarounds, assessing whether these buy short-term flexibility
at the cost of increasing the risk of a long-term lock-in.
In the case considered here, three practices proved
important when the organization’s internal efforts did not
bring the desired change. First, spearheading describes the
relentless efforts by individuals (most importantly, the head
of Revenue Management Strategy) to raise awareness of
the problem through speeches at industry events, practitioner publications, and press releases. Second, interface
management describes the practice of opening up to outside innovation and working with a capable vendor. In this
way, the firm could integrate new and innovative ideas into
the existing ways of working. Third, piloting describes the
organization joining forces with other industry actors in
order to finally achieve the desired change. The prerequisite for all these practices was a strong internal knowledge
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base, which recognized the opportunities that arose and
could relate them to the weaknesses and opportunities of
their own systems and practices.
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